• The certificates used for signing and verification need to be valid for digital signatures. Otherwise Identity Manager will fail on writing to the database.
  
  

# History cleaning task
historyCleaningTrigger.cronExpression = 0 30 0 ? * FRI *

# History verification task
historyVerificationTrigger.cronExpression = 0 30 0 ? * SUN *

The keys and certificates used for signing and verification are configured in the encrypt and sign engine's configuration, typically found under engineSignEncryptConfig.xml. 

1. Configure the key used for the chained signature via the property descriptorName of the bean historyServiceSigner. Add the following to system.properties in the system properties part of the docker-compose.yml file:

   Code Block
   title Add key for chained signature
   historyServiceSigner.descriptorName=<name of the descriptor>

   
   

2. If the chained signature is not configured, Tomcat startup will fail with an error message like:
   

   Code Block
   title Error message from Tomcat
   Error accessing the sign and encrypt engine (5, No descriptor found with name: overwriteMe)

   
   

1. Verify the chained signatures with a REST service call to this url: 
   

   Panel
   title URL for manual verification of chained signature
   <prime-explorer>/ws/objecthistory/verify[?tenantId=<tenant for login>]

   where the tenantId is optional.

2. The login can be done via basic authentication. For example, if you log in as admin/admin the following header is added, where YWRtaW46YWRtaW4= is the "admin:admin" Base64-encoded:
   

   Code Block
   Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=

   
   

3. Some REST service clients support convenient entry of basic authentication with fields. If preemptive authentication is offered, you should use that, since the REST service do not ask for authentication, but rather just fail if no authentication is offered.
4. The result is either 'true' if everything is fine or 'false' if a verification failed. Details about verification errors are listed in a log file.

A scheduled job regularly checks the signature chain of the object history. If an error is found, it will send an email to configurable recipients.

As the object history signature spans over all history entries, regardless of the tenant, the verification on a multi tenant system should be done by a dedicated user that belongs to no tenant (that is, it has a null tenantId), but who performs this task for the whole system. Use the Identity Manager Tenant application to create such a user:

1. In system.propertiesIn the system properties part of the docker-compose.yml file, set the following (also needed for "scheduled cleaning" below):

   Code Block
   title System property: Add user for scheduled task in system.properties
   # System user for scheduled tasks. Executes tasks relevant to ALL tenants. # Username cronUsername.encrypted=admin # Password cronPassword.encrypted=admin

   
   

2. Configure the SMTP server in Identity Manager. See Set up email template in Identity Manager.

3. Several attributes can be configured in system.properties in the system properties part of the docker-compose.yml file. Note that a property may span over several lines by ending intermediate lines with a backslash. At the very least, you must configure a recipient.
   This is an example of system.properties:

   Code Block
   title system.System properties
   # When to execute. Fields: Seconds Minutes Hours Day-of-Month Month Day-of-Week Year(optional) historyVerificationTrigger.cronExpression = 0 30 0 ? * SUN * # Email address of users to be notified by scheduling jobs. # Next line is mandatory! #schedulingReporter.to = #schedulingReporter.cc = # Subject and contents of the mail to send on verification errors historyVerificationJobDetail.jobDataMap[subject] = Error verifying object history signature historyVerificationJobDetail.jobDataMap[text] = Hi there,\n\ something has gone wrong with the object history signature.\n\ For more details, please have a look at the server log.\n\ \n\

   
   

4. Also see "Define Cut-Off For Verification / Cleanup Window" below!

A scheduled job regularly cleans the signature chain of the object history. 

As the object history signature spans over all history entries, regardless of the tenant, the cleaning on a multi tenant system should be done by a dedicated user that belongs to no tenant (that is, it has a null tenantId), but who performs this task for the whole system. Use the Identity Manager Tenant application to create such a user:

1. In system.propertiesthe docker-compose.yml file, set the following system property: (also needed "scheduled verification" above):

   Code Block
   title System property: Add user for scheduled task in system.properties
   # System user for scheduled tasks. Executes tasks relevant to ALL tenants. # Username cronUsername.encrypted=admin # Password cronPassword.encrypted=admin

   
   

2. Several attributes can be configured in with system . properties. Note that a property may span over several lines by ending intermediate lines with a backslash. 
   This is an example of system.propertiesa configuration of the system property:

   Code Block
   title system.propertiesConfigure a system property for object history cleaning
   # When to execute. Fields: Seconds Minutes Hours Day-of-Month Month Day-of-Week Year(optional) historyCleaningTrigger.cronExpression = 0 30 0 ? * FRI *

   
   

3. Also see "Define Cut-Off For Verification / Cleanup Window" below!.

To be able to delete history entries when deleting a core object, you need to must add theobjectHistoryRemovalStrategy.removeWhenDeletingCoreObject property to the system .properties file of properties part of the docker-compose.yml file for Identity Manager Operator. This property is intentionally not provided by default.

1. Inthe system .propertiesproperties part of the docker-compose.yml file, add the property below and set it to true:

   Code Block
   title Add system .propertiesproperty
   # Delete object history entries together with the entities objectHistoryRemovalStrategy.removeWhenDeletingCoreObject = true

   Now the history entries will be deleted together with the core object itself.

By default the verification windows spans the entire history. You can limit it to the last N >= 12 months. This will enable deletion of older entries outside the verification window. Smaller values will be overridden by 12.

This will enable cleanup of older entries outside the verification window to reduce the amount of stored data.

If no cut-off is specified, the entire history is validated (default), and cleanup has no effect.

1. Enter this in system.properties In the system properties part of the docker-compose.yml file, enter this to specify a window starting 12 months in the past and ending at the current time:

   Code Block
   title Specify timeframe in system . properties
   # new parameter name in IDM 2204 (used to be "commonHistoryService.verificationIntervalMonths") commonHistoryService.historyCutOffDuration=12

   
   

Note that if a verification window is set, the following applies:

• verification will fail if the oldest entry of any chain within the verification window points to a deleted predecessor
• if verification fails for entries outside the verification window, this will be logged

In a clustered environment there is a separate chain per cluster node. With the default configuration, the chain's name is derived from the cluster node, that is, the jvmRoute attribute of the engine tag found in the server.xml. The implementation uses only the primary engine and does not support any special cases.

If there is a special cluster configuration, or if a cluster is not based on a unique jvmRoute per node, the attribute commonHistoryService.chainName needs to be provided. If this attribute is not found, like typically in single node environments, PRIME1 is used as default name.

Each history entry corresponds to an action that was performed on a core object in Identity Manager. Thus it belongs to a single tenant. The chained signature of the history on the other hand is global: there's exactly one chain for each cluster node, that spans over all history entries, regardless of the tenant. The signature ensures that no history entry of a Identity Manager cluster node has been manipulated.

For this reason it is recommended that the signature verification is performed by an administrator that is not bound to a tenant, that is, with an tenantId of null. The scheduled task that performs history verification should, in case of an error, be configured to send an email to a global user that administers Identity Manager for all tenants. It is still possible to verify the signatures with a user belonging to a tenant, but this should only be done on single tenant systems.