Descriptor overview

The engine’s descriptors are the following:

Each descriptor is described in detail in the sections below, including requirements how it shall be bootstrapped.

EncryptedFields

David Banz here you can decide if you want to keep the bullet list-style, or if we should go for a table instead. What do you prefer? (Table first, then the bullet list directly under the table for reference.)
Josefin Klang (Deactivated) the table has a lot of ugly linebreaks because of long lines and many columns, so not sure if it looks that good… David Banz good point, let’s stick to the bullet lists then for now.

• use-case: Encryption and decryption of fields in the Identity Manager database

• required: always

• configured in these applications:

  • Identity Manager Admin (previously know as PRIME Designer)

  • Identity Manager Operator (previously known as PRIME Explorer)

• configured in these special-case tools:

  • batch_secretfieldstore_change_encryption_key

    (repair tool for secret fields)

  • batch_migration_smartact_to_prime

    (for migration of data from Identity Manager's/PRIME's predecessor SmartAct, it has additional requirements for decrypting secret fields and config entries from the source system)

• storage: pkcs12, HSM (recommended)

• versioning: not supported, always uses version 1

• supported asymClipher values:

  • for HSM

    • RSA/ECB/OAEPWithSHA-384AndMGF1Padding

    • RSA/ECB/OAEPWithSHA-512AndMGF1Padding

  • for PKCS#12

    • RSA/None/OAEPWithSHA384AndMGF1Padding

    • RSA/None/OAEPWithSHA512AndMGF1Padding

• general requirements:

  • placeholder keys/certs forbidden for productive use

    • confidentiality of database secrets would be at risk

    • the key can only be changed with the tool batch_secretfieldstore_change_encryption_key once the first secret is stored in the database

• key requirements:

  • supported types:

    • RSA 2048

    • RSA 3072

    • RSA 4096 (recommended)

• certificate requirements:

  • no special requirements, as only the key-pair is used

    • may be self-signed

    • key usage is not checked (recommended for informational purposes: set dataEncipherment)

    • validity is ignored

    • certificate does not need to be trusted

ConfigZipEncrypter

• use-case: Encryption of the configuration files

• required: always

• configured in these applications

  • Identity Manager Admin / (earlier know as PRIME Designer)

  • Identity Manager Operator / (earlier known as PRIME Explorer)

• storage: pkcs12, HSM (recommended)

• versioning: not supported, always uses version 1

• supported asymClipher values:

  • for HSM

    • RSA/ECB/OAEPWithSHA-384AndMGF1Padding

    • RSA/ECB/OAEPWithSHA-512AndMGF1Padding

  • for PKCS#12

    • RSA/None/OAEPWithSHA384AndMGF1Padding

    • RSA/None/OAEPWithSHA512AndMGF1Padding

  • NOTE: you cannot reconfigure the asymCipher after exporting an encrypted ZIP, as config import of such a ZIP will fail

• general requirements:

  • placeholder allowed only if config ZIP encryption is disabled

    • after changing the key you cannot decrypt previously exported config ZIPs that use encryption

• key requirements:

  • supported types:

    • RSA 2048

    • RSA 3072

    • RSA 4096 (recommended)

• certificate requirements:

  • no special requirements, as only the key-pair is used

    • may be self-signed

    • key usage is not checked (recommended for informational purposes: set dataEncipherment + keyEncipherment)

    • validity is ignored

    • certificate does not need to be trusted

ConfigZipSigner

• use-case: Signing and validation of the configuration files

• configured in these applications:

  • Identity Manager Admin

  • Identity Manager Operator

• certificate requirements:

  • if key usage extension is critical, then digitalSignature is required

  • issuing certificate has to be installed in the Identity Manager trust-store

  • certificate must not be self-signed

• storage: pkcs12, HSM (recommended)

• versioning: possible, but unnecessary (It is sufficient that the certificate that signed the old configs is trusted via the IDM truststore)

• supported digest value: (selecting SHA-384 or SHA-512 only affects MANIFEST.MF, other parts use SHA-256 always)

  • SHA-256

• general requirements:

  • placeholder allowed only if config ZIP signing and verification is disabled

• key requirements:

  • supported types:

    • RSA 2048

    • RSA 3072

    • RSA 4096 (recommended)

• certificate requirements:

  • if key usage extension is critical, then digitalSignature is required

  • issuing CA cert must be in IDM truststore

  • must not be self-signed!

  • validity considerations:

    • if expired download is blocked unless ZIP signing is disabled

    • if expired config upload will fail with the message "Verification failed. The certificate has expired."

• issues if not configured as above:

  • export is blocked unless unless ZIP signing is disabled

  • verification does not work, ZIP appears unsigned

ObjectHistorySigner

• use-case: Signing and verification of the object history

• configured in these applications:

  • Identity Manager Admin (technically not used here, but required for startup due to bean requirements - subject to change in future releases)

  • Identity Manager Operator

• configured in these special-case tools:

  • batch_re-sign_history

    (repair tool for history signature)

  • batch_migration_smartact_to_prime

    (for migration of data from Identity Manager's/PRIME's predecessor SmartAct)

• storage: pkcs12, HSM (recommended)

• versioning: supported (signatures created with old versions can still be verified)

• supported digest values: (changing the digest after history entries have been written requires a new version of the descriptor or startup will fail!)

  • SHA-256

  • SHA-384

  • SHA-512

• general requirements:

  • placeholder allowed only if history verification is disabled (via activitiHistoryCleanerJobTrigger.cronExpression set to a date in the distant future, see List of Identity Manager system properties and Quartz CronTrigger tutorial )

    • integrity of history signature would be as risk

    • re-signing requires use of the batch_re-sign_history tool once the first history entry is created

    • if you plan on enabling it at a later date, it is recommended not to use a placeholder

• key requirements:

  • supported types:

    • RSA 2048

    • RSA 3072

    • RSA 4096 (recommended)

• certificate requirements:

  • if key usage extension is critical, then digitalSignature is required

  • may be self-signed

  • validity is ignored

  • certificate does not need to be trusted

SignEmailDescriptor

• use-case: send signed e-mails from IDM

• configured in this application:

  • Identity Manager Operator

• storage: pkcs12, HSM (recommended)

• versioning: supported, but unnecessary

• supported algorithm values:

  • for RSA keys only

    • SHA256withRSA  

    • SHA384withRSA

    • SHA512withRSA

  • for ECC keys only

    • SHA256withECDSA

    • SHA384withECDSA

    • SHA512withECDSA

• general requirements:

  • placeholders allowed only if email signing is not used

    • e-mail verification will fail if not issued by a trusted S/MIME CA

    • integrity of e-mails sent by IDM may be at risk if placeholder key is used

• key requirements:

  • supported types:

    • RSA 2048

    • RSA 3072

    • RSA 4096

    • ECC NIST P-256

    • ECC NIST P-384

    • ECC NIST P-521

• certificate requirements:

  • proper S/MIME certificate with configured IDM e-mail sender address in DN's E field and/or SAN RFC-822 entry

    • if subject DN email field is absent, SAN extension must be critical!

    • IDM up to 23.10.x only accepted SAN and ignored DN.E (fixed in IDM 24.R1)

  • must not be self-signed!

  • key usage: if present, must be critical and at least either digitalSignature or nonRepudiation

  • validity: adhering to CAB-Forum requirements from https://cabforum.org/working-groups/smime/requirements/#632-certificate-operational-periods-and-key-pair-usage-periods (825 days max. at the time of writing)

hermodDeviceEnc

• use-case: generate dummy certificate for transient key-pairs generated on a target device when provisioning Smart ID Mobile / Desktop App profiles (the certificates themselves are merely used as transport container for the key-usage parameter)

• configured in this application:

  • Identity Manager Operator

• storage: pkcs12

• versioning: possible, but unnecessary

• supported algorithm values:

  • for RSA keys only

    • SHA256withRSA  

    • SHA384withRSA

    • SHA512withRSA

  • for ECC keys only

    • SHA256withECDSA

    • SHA384withECDSA

    • SHA512withECDSA

• general requirements:

  • placeholders allowed

• key requirements:

  • supported types:

    • RSA 2048

    • RSA 3072

    • RSA 4096

    • ECC NIST P-256 (best performance)

    • ECC NIST P-384

    • ECC NIST P-521

• certificate requirements

  • may be self-signed

  • validity is ignored

  • key usage is not checked (recommended for informational purposes: set digitalSignature)

  • certificate does not need to be trusted

SelfServiceJWTSigner

• use-case: Authentication of Smart ID Self-Service users to the Identity Manager backend

• configured in this application:

  • Identity Manager Operator

• storage: pkcs12, HSM (recommended)

• versioning: possible, but unnecessary

• general requirements:

  • placeholder keys forbidden for productive use

    • even if IDM SelfService is not deployed the related REST endpoints could face the risk of unauthenticated access

• key requirements:

  • supported types:

    • RSA 2048

    • RSA 3072

    • RSA 4096 (recommended)

• certificate requirements:

  • may be self-signed

  • validity is ignored

  • key usage is not checked (recommended for informational purposes: set digitalSignature)

  • certificate does not need to be trusted

ContentProviderJWSSigner

• use case: signing content for Visual ID provisioning to Smart ID Mobile App

• configured in this application:

  • Identity Manager Operator (see Set up visual ID layout in Identity Manager)

• storage: pkcs12, HSM (recommended)

• versioning: possible, but unnecessary

• general requirements:

  • placeholder allowed only if Visual ID is not used

    • if the certificate configured here is not trusted by the end-user (mobile-) device, then Visual ID provisioning will fail

    • forgery of Visual ID possible if placeholder key is used and also trusted by the end-user device

• key requirements:

  • supported types:

    • RSA 2048

    • RSA 3072

    • RSA 4096 (recommended)

• certificate requirements:

  • must not be self-signed!

  • key usage is not checked (recommended for informational purposes: set digitalSignature)

  • issuing CA cert must be trusted by the app onto which to provision Visual IDs

  • validity: at your discretion (make sure you do not forget to renew before the expiry date!), validity is checked on the SDK side

• versioning not needed (always uses the default (i.e. highest) version)

Misc Attestation Key Descriptors (att_…)

• default descriptor names:

  • att_external-attestation-1 (mobile only)

  •  att_external-attestation-2 (mobile only)

  •  att_external-attestation-3 (mobile only)

  •  att_external-attestation-4 (mobile only)

  •  att_ATTESTATION (mobile+desktop, default)

• use-case:

  • verify Certification Signing Requests (CSR) from Smart ID Mobile / Smart ID Desktop App.

  • optionally limit profile provisioning with Smart ID Mobile / Smart ID Desktop App to certain devices, e.g. company devices. This can be done by using Mobile/Desktop apps with custom private keys and configuring the corresponding public keys into IDM (by default IDM includes certificates for the built-in keys of any Mobile and Desktop App installation)

• configured in these applications:

  • Identity Manager Operator

  • Identity Manager Admin (technically not used here, but required for startup due to bean requirements - subject to change in future releases)

• versioning: supported

• storage: pkcs12, HSM (recommended)

• general requirements:

  • default certificates do not need to be changed, unless you want to limit profile provisioning to certain devices

  • no private keys is configured for IDM, only each public key inside a certificate

• key requirements:

  • supported types:

    • RSA 2048

    • RSA 3072

    • RSA 4096 (recommended)

• certificate requirements:

  • when replacing, generated via tooling shown here: https://doc.nexusgroup.com/pub/configure-custom-attestation-keys

  • verification only uses the key, no part of the certificate is considered

  • key usage is not checked (recommended for informational purposes: set digitalSignature)

  • validity is ignored

idopteAuthentication

• use-case: initial handshake with Idopte client-side middleware, see Encoding using Idopte middleware in Identity Manager

• configured in this application:

  • Identity Manager Operator

• storage: pkcs12

• versioning: not supported (always uses the default (i.e. highest) version

• supported algorithm value: NONEwithRSA

• general requirements:

  • descriptor can be omitted entirely (not even a placeholder needed) if Idopte middleware is not used, otherwise correct certificate and keypair is required

  • PKI card encoding via the Idopte middleware will fail if missing or configured incorrectly

• key requirements:

  • supported type:

    • RSA 2048

• certificate requirements:

  • Idopte webapp cert, issued by Idopte based on CSR for a customer-generated keypair

  • one customer-specific SAN URI (does not have to point to an existing website), e.g. https://idopte.customer.com (using hosts like localhost or 127.x.y.z is discouraged, as it severely restricts the maximum validity period of the certificate Idopte can issue)

  • validity: defined by the Idopte CA

insideClientAuth

• use-case: authenticate to the IN Groupe Inside Server, which performs certain cryptographic operations on behalf of IDM when using the Idopte middleware (see Encoding using Idopte middleware in Identity Manager)

• configured in this application:

  • Identity Manager Operator

• general requirements:

  • descriptor can be omitted entirely (not even a placeholder needed) if Idopte middleware is not used, otherwise correct certificate and keypair is required

  • PKI card encoding via the Idopte middleware will fail if missing or configured incorrectly

• algorithm attribute not used

  •  (we only use certificate and private key from the descriptor)

• versioning: not needed

• storage: pkcs12

• key requirements:

  • supported types:

    • RSA 2048

    • RSA 3072

    • RSA 4096 (recommended)

• certificate requirements:

  • validity DOES matter, connection to Inside server will fail when expired

  • recommend to use a CA, unclear if self-signed certificates work

  • must be trusted by Inside server

  • key usage: digitalSignature

Pin-Blob Decryption Descriptors

• descriptor names: can be any descriptor listed in the pinBlobDecryptor.keyDescriptorNames property of system.properties (or its Docker counterpart)

• use-case: decrypting pin-blobs from pre-personalized cards to e.g. print pin letters for them (see Encodings using Personal Desktop Client middleware in Identity Manager (section "Read encrypted PINs")

• configured in this application:

  • Identity Manager Operator

• supported algorithm value: RSA

• storage: pkcs12, HSM (recommended)

• versioning: not needed

• general requirements:

  • by default the property is empty, hence no descriptors  are needed, unless the feature is required

• key requirements:

  • supported types:

    • RSA 2048

• certificate requirements:

  • issued by Nexus Certificate Manager

  • validity ignored by IDM

  • does not need to be trusted by IDM

  • key usage is not checked (recommended for informational purposes: set dataEncipherment + keyEncipherment)