This article is new for Identity Manager 5.0.1. |
The engine’s descriptors are the following:
Descriptor | Description |
|---|---|
encryptedFields | Encryption and decryption of fields in the Identity Manager database |
configZipEncrypter | Encryption of the configuration files |
configZipSigner | Signing and validation of the configuration files |
objectHistorySigner | Signing and verification of the object history |
signEmailDescriptor | Signing of emails |
hermodDeviceEnc | Creation of device encryption certificates that are used in Smart ID messaging |
SelfServiceJWTSigner | Authentication of Smart ID Self-Service users to the Identity Manager backend |
ContentProviderJWSSigner | Creation of JWS signatures used for Smart ID messaging content provider API |
idopteAuthentication | Initial handshake with Idopte client-side middleware |
insideClientAuth | Authentication to the IN Groupe Inside Server |
att_* | Attestation for provisioning to Smart ID Mobile / Desktop Apps |
(arbitrary name) | Decryption of PIN blobs from pre-personalized smart-cards created with the Personal Desktop Client |
Each descriptor is described in detail in the sections below, including requirements how it shall be bootstrapped.
Certain descriptors are used for optional features. If a certain feature (for example email signing) is not used in a given deployment, then you may configure the descriptor in question with a placeholder. Any PKCS#12 file containing a self-signed keypair will be sufficient in this case.
Descriptor included in default configuration. Correct bootstrapping is required for productive use. Only dev- and test systems may use placeholders (for example created with bootstrap.zip package or the corresponding docker container). |
Encryption and decryption of fields in the Identity Manager database
Identity Manager Admin
Identity Manager Operator
batch_secretfieldstore_change_encryption_key
(repair tool for secret fields)
batch_migration_smartact_to_prime
(for migration of data from Identity Manager's/PRIME's predecessor SmartAct, it has additional requirements for decrypting secret fields and config entries from the source system)
HSM (recommended)
pkcs12
Not supported, always uses version 1
For HSM:
RSA/ECB/OAEPWithSHA-384AndMGF1Padding
RSA/ECB/OAEPWithSHA-512AndMGF1Padding
For PKCS#12:
RSA/None/OAEPWithSHA384AndMGF1Padding
RSA/None/OAEPWithSHA512AndMGF1Padding
Placeholder keys/certs forbidden for productive use
Confidentiality of database secrets would be at risk
The key can only be changed with the tool batch_secretfieldstore_change_encryption_key once the first secret is stored in the database
RSA 2048
RSA 3072
RSA 4096 (recommended)
No special requirements, as only the key-pair is used
May be self-signed
Key usage is not checked (recommended for informational purposes: set dataEncipherment)
Validity is ignored
Certificate does not need to be trusted
Descriptor included in default configuration. Correct bootstrapping may be required for productive use, depending on the use case. Dev- and test systems may use placeholders (for example created with bootstrap.zip package or the corresponding docker container). |
Encryption of the configuration files
Identity Manager Admin
Identity Manager Operator
HSM (recommended)
pkcs12
Not supported, always uses version 1
For HSM:
RSA/ECB/OAEPWithSHA-384AndMGF1Padding
RSA/ECB/OAEPWithSHA-512AndMGF1Padding
For PKCS#12:
RSA/None/OAEPWithSHA384AndMGF1Padding
RSA/None/OAEPWithSHA512AndMGF1Padding
You cannot reconfigure the asymCipher after exporting an encrypted ZIP, as config import of such a ZIP will fail. |
Placeholder allowed only if config ZIP encryption is disabled
After changing the key you cannot decrypt previously exported config ZIPs that use encryption
RSA 2048
RSA 3072
RSA 4096 (recommended)
No special requirements, as only the key-pair is used
May be self-signed
Key usage is not checked (recommended for informational purposes: set dataEncipherment + keyEncipherment)
Validity is ignored
Certificate does not need to be trusted
Descriptor included in default configuration. Correct bootstrapping may be required for productive use, depending on the use case. Dev- and test systems may use placeholders (for example created with bootstrap.zip package or the corresponding docker container). |
Signing and validation of the configuration files
Identity Manager Admin
Identity Manager Operator
HSM (recommended)
pkcs12
Possible, but unnecessary. (It is sufficient that the certificate that signed the old configs is trusted via the IDM truststore.)
(Selecting SHA-384 or SHA-512 only affects MANIFEST.MF, other parts use SHA-256 always.)
SHA-256
Placeholder allowed only if config ZIP encryption is disabled
RSA 2048
RSA 3072
RSA 4096 (recommended)
If key usage extension is critical, then digitalSignature is required
Issuing CA cert must be in IDM truststore
Must not be self-signed
Validity considerations:
if expired download is blocked unless ZIP signing is disabled
if expired config upload will fail with the message "Verification failed. The certificate has expired."
Issues if not configured as above:
export is blocked unless unless ZIP signing is disabled
verification does not work, ZIP appears unsigned
Descriptor included in default configuration. Correct bootstrapping may be required for productive use, depending on the use case. Dev- and test systems may use placeholders (for example created with bootstrap.zip package or the corresponding docker container). |
Signing and verification of the object history
Identity Manager Admin (technically not used here, but required for startup due to bean requirements - subject to change in future releases)
Identity Manager Operator
batch_re-sign_history
(repair tool for history signature)
batch_migration_smartact_to_prime
(for migration of data from Identity Manager's/PRIME's predecessor SmartAct)
HSM (recommended)
pkcs12
Supported (signatures created with old versions can still be verified)
Changing the digest after history entries have been written requires a new version of the descriptor or startup will fail. |
SHA-256
SHA-384
SHA-512
Placeholder allowed only if history verification is disabled (via activitiHistoryCleanerJobTrigger.cronExpression set to a date in the distant future. See List of Identity Manager system properties and Quartz CronTrigger tutorial for more information)
Integrity of history signature would be as risk
Re-signing requires use of the batch_re-sign_history tool once the first history entry is created
If you plan on enabling it at a later date, it is recommended not to use a placeholder
RSA 2048
RSA 3072
RSA 4096 (recommended)
If key usage extension is critical, then digitalSignature is required
May be self-signed
Validity is ignored
Certificate does not need to be trusted
Descriptor included in default configuration. Correct bootstrapping may be required for productive use, depending on the use case. Dev- and test systems may use placeholders (for example created with bootstrap.zip package or the corresponding docker container). |
Send signed emails from IDM
When email signing is configured
Identity Manager Operator
HSM (recommended)
pkcs12
Supported, but unnecessary
For RSA keys only:
SHA256withRSA
SHA384withRSA
SHA512withRSA
For ECC keys only:
SHA256withECDSA
SHA384withECDSA
SHA512withECDSA
Placeholders allowed only if email signing is not used
Email verification will fail if not issued by a trusted S/MIME CA
Integrity of emails sent by IDM may be at risk if placeholder key is used
RSA 2048
RSA 3072
RSA 4096
ECC NIST P-256
ECC NIST P-384
ECC NIST P-521
Proper S/MIME certificate with configured IDM email sender address in DN's E field and/or SAN RFC-822 entry
If subject DN email field is absent, SAN extension must be critical
Broken support for DN.E is fixed in IDM 5.0.0.
must not be self-signed
Key usage:
If present, must be critical and at least either digitalSignature or nonRepudiation
Validity:
Adhering to CAB-Forum requirements from https://cabforum.org/working-groups/smime/requirements/#632-certificate-operational-periods-and-key-pair-usage-periods
Descriptor included in default configuration. Bootstrapping required for technical reasons, but with relaxed security requirements compared to other use cases. |
Generate dummy certificate for transient key-pairs generated on a target device when provisioning Smart ID Mobile/Desktop App profiles (the certificates themselves are merely used as transport container for the key-usage parameter)
Identity Manager Operator
pkcs12
Possible, but unnecessary
For RSA keys only:
SHA256withRSA
SHA384withRSA
SHA512withRSA
For ECC keys only:
SHA256withECDSA
SHA384withECDSA
SHA512withECDSA
Placeholders allowed
RSA 2048
RSA 3072
RSA 4096
ECC NIST P-256 (best performance)
ECC NIST P-384
ECC NIST P-521
May be self-signed
Validity is ignored
Key usage is not checked (recommended for informational purposes: set digitalSignature)
Certificate does not need to be trusted
Descriptor included in default configuration. Correct bootstrapping is required for productive use. Only dev- and test systems may use placeholders (for example created with bootstrap.zip package or the corresponding docker container). |
Authentication of Smart ID Self-Service users to the Identity Manager backend
Identity Manager Operator
HSM (recommended)
pkcs12
Possible, but unnecessary.
Placeholder keys forbidden for productive use
Even if Smart ID Self-Service is not deployed the related REST endpoints could face the risk of unauthenticated access
RSA 2048
RSA 3072
RSA 4096 (recommended)
May be self-signed
Validity is ignored
Key usage is not checked (recommended for informational purposes: set digitalSignature)
Certificate does not need to be trusted
Descriptor included in default configuration. Correct bootstrapping may be required for productive use, depending on the use case. Dev- and test systems may use placeholders (for example created with bootstrap.zip package or the corresponding docker container). |
Signing content for Visual ID provisioning to Smart ID Mobile App
Identity Manager Operator (See Set up visual ID layout in Identity Manager for more information.)
HSM (recommended)
pkcs12
Possible, but unnecessary.
Placeholder allowed only if Visual ID is not used
If the certificate configured here is not trusted by the end-user (mobile-) device, then Visual ID provisioning will fail
Forgery of Visual ID possible if placeholder key is used and also trusted by the end-user device
RSA 2048
RSA 3072
RSA 4096 (recommended)
Must not be self-signed
Key usage is not checked (recommended for informational purposes: set digitalSignature)
Issuing CA cert must be trusted by the app onto which to provision Visual IDs
Validity: at your discretion (make sure you do not forget to renew before the expiry date!), validity is checked on the SDK side
Versioning not needed (always uses the default (that is, highest) version)
Descriptors included in default configuration. Correct bootstrapping may be required for productive use, depending on the use case. Replacement of the default certificates is optional. |
att_external-attestation-1 (mobile only)
att_external-attestation-2 (mobile only)
att_external-attestation-3 (mobile only)
att_external-attestation-4 (mobile only)
att_ATTESTATION (mobile+desktop, default)
Verify Certification Signing Requests (CSR) from Smart ID Mobile/Smart ID Desktop App.
Optionally limit profile provisioning with Smart ID Mobile/Smart ID Desktop App to certain devices, for example company devices. This can be done by using Mobile/Desktop apps with custom private keys and configuring the corresponding public keys in Identity Manager (by default Identity Manager includes certificates for the built-in keys of any Mobile and Desktop App installation)
Identity Manager Operator
Identity Manager Admin (technically not used here, but required for startup due to bean requirements - subject to change in future releases)
HSM (recommended)
pkcs12
Supported
Default certificates do not need to be changed, unless you want to limit profile provisioning to certain devices
No private keys is configured for Identity Manager, only each public key inside a certificate
RSA 2048
RSA 3072
RSA 4096 (recommended)
When replacing, generated via tooling shown here: Configure custom attestation keys
Verification only uses the key, no part of the certificate is considered
Key usage is not checked (recommended for informational purposes: set digitalSignature)
Validity is ignored
Descriptor not present by default, can be ignored unless the Idopte middleware is used for PKI card production. |
Initial handshake with Idopte client-side middleware, see Encoding using Idopte middleware in Identity Manager
Identity Manager Operator
pkcs12
Not supported (always uses the default (that is, highest) version
NONEwithRSA
Descriptor can be omitted entirely (not even a placeholder needed) if Idopte middleware is not used, otherwise correct certificate and keypair is required
PKI card encoding via the Idopte middleware will fail if missing or configured incorrectly
RSA 2048
Idopte webapp cert, issued by Idopte based on CSR for a customer-generated keypair
One customer-specific SAN URI (does not have to point to an existing website), for example https://idopte.customer.com (using hosts like localhost or 127.x.y.z is discouraged, as it severely restricts the maximum validity period of the certificate Idopte can issue)
Validity: defined by the Idopte CA
Descriptor not present by default, can be skipped unless the Idopte middleware is used for PKI card production. |
Authenticate to the IN Groupe Inside Server, which performs certain cryptographic operations on behalf of IDM when using the Idopte middleware (see Encoding using Idopte middleware in Identity Manager)
Identity Manager Operator
pkcs12
Not needed
Descriptor can be omitted entirely (not even a placeholder needed) if Idopte middleware is not used, otherwise correct certificate and keypair is required
PKI card encoding via the Idopte middleware will fail if missing or configured incorrectly
Algorithm attribute not used
(We only use certificate and private key from the descriptor)
RSA 2048
RSA 3072
RSA 4096 (recommended)
Validity DOES matter, connection to Inside server will fail when expired
Recommend to use a CA, unclear if self-signed certificates work
Must be trusted by Inside server
Key usage: digitalSignature
Descriptors not present by default, can be skipped unless pin-blobs from pre-personalized cards (using Personal Desktop Client/KGS) have to be decrypted. |
Can be any descriptor listed in the pinBlobDecryptor.keyDescriptorNames property of system.properties (or its docker counterpart)
Decrypting pin-blobs from pre-personalized cards to for example print pin letters for them (see Encodings using Personal Desktop Client middleware in Identity Manager (section "Read encrypted PINs")
Identity Manager Operator
pkcs12
Not needed
RSA
By default the property is empty, hence no descriptors are needed, unless the feature is required
RSA 2048
Issued by Nexus Certificate Manager
Validity ignored by IDM
Does not need to be trusted by IDM
Key usage is not checked (recommended for informational purposes: set dataEncipherment + keyEncipherment)
For more information, see Encrypt configuration files in Identity Manager.