1. Define like this in the encoding description:
   
   

   [Fields]
   CERT_FIELD=
   ...
    
   [Application_A]
   WriteCertificate=true
   Certificate=CERT_FIELD

   Description of the elements:
   

   Element	Description
   WriteCertificate=true	Triggers to write a certificate.
   Certificate=...	Specifies from which defined field the certificate is taken. The field's value has to be a base64 encoded X.509 certificate.

Use this application command to write a structure of base64 encoded certificate and base64 encoded keypair to the smartcard. It can be used as a surrogate to writing a PKCS#12 container directly to the smartcard (even with root and intermediate certificates, that have no private key attached).

1. Define like this in the encoding description:
   

   [Fields]
   ENCR_CERT_KEY_LIST=
   ENCR_CERT_KEY_LIST_RETURN=
   ...
    
   [Application_C]
   WriteCertKeyList=true
   CertKeyList=ENCR_CERT_KEY_LIST
   CertKeyListReturnField=ENCR_CERT_KEY_LIST_RETURN
   CertKeyListMode=WRITE_ANY_BUT_MANDATORILY_THE_FIRST

   Description of the elements:
   

   Element	Description
   WriteCertKeyList=true	Triggers to write a certificate-key-list.
   CertKeyList=...	The description key for the input string. (Corresponds to the structure: "<1. cert>,<1. private key>;<2. cert>,<2. private key>;..." without the square brackets, see examples below. You can pass one or multiple certificate-key like that, each base64 encoded.) The base64 encoded certificate is left-handed to the comma separator and the base64 encoded private key (if any, otherwise empty) is right-handed to the comma separator and each pair of certificate-privatekey is terminated by a semicolon. The certificate and private key are both in DER encoded format and then each base64 encoded.
   CertKeyListReturnField=...	The description key where to set the field definition that later gets the list of written certificates.
   CertKeyListMode=...	Sets the mode for reacting on errors when writing the certificate-key-list to the smartcard. Options are: WRITE_ALL (default) - All certificates and keypairs have to be successfully written, otherwise the application was not successful. WRITE_ANY - This is the "don't care" case. WRITE_ANY_BUT_MANDATORILY_THE_FIRST - In this mode the first certificate-key has to be mandatorily written successfully (the others may be not written) in order to have this application be successful. The certificates are sorted chronologically (newer certificates first), that is, if the card is full (and you did not set "WRITE_ALL"), only some older certificates may be unwritten.

   
   

   StoreUserCertsOnly is ignored for the WriteCertKeyList use-case and all certs from the list are written.

To delete certificates (and optionally their associated keys) on a token, it can be necessary to select special certificates by a selection criteria.

1. Define like this in the encoding description:
   

   [Fields]
   DEL_CRITERIA=
   
   [Application_A]
   DeleteCertKeyObjects=true
   DeleteCertKeyObjectsCriteria=DEL_CRITERIA
   
   [Application_B]
   DeleteCertKeyObjects=true
   DeleteCertsOnly=true
   DeleteCertKeyObjectsCriteria=Key_Usage(keyEncipherment,dataEncipherment)

   Description of the elements:
   

   Element	Description
   DeleteCertKeyObjects=true	Enables deletion of certificates and their associated keys according to given criteria. The parameter name is historic and retained for compatibility.
   DeleteCertsOnly=true	Overrides the default behavior of deleting certificates and keys and instead deletes certificates only.
   DeleteCertKeyObjectsCriteria=...	Defines the selection criteria to be used to find the certificates. This option can have one of these values: SOME_FIELD_NAME The name of a mapped field, containing one of the deletion criteria shown below: KeyUsage (fixed, comma-separated strings)  or Key_Usage (fixed, comma-separated strings) Pass at least one string, which can be mapped to an implementation of type ICertificateSelectionStrategy. Only certificates (with their keys) matching exactly these specified KeyUsage(s) will be deleted. Possible values are decipherOnly, encipherOnly, cRLSign, keyCertSign, keyAgreement, dataEncipherment, keyEncipherment, nonRepudiation, digitalSignature Label (fixed string) The label of the certificate and keypair to be deleted. Only one value can be set here. To delete more than one certificate by label, add multiple applications. CertSerial (fixed, comma-separated strings) or Cert_Serial (fixed, comma-separated strings) Pass at least one certificate serial number in hex-format. It is not possible to leave the parentheses empty. If you use a mapped field, you can link it to a process variable created e.g. via a Groovy script like this: binding.variables["MY_DELETION_CRITERA"] = 'CertSerial(' + binding.variables["MyCertDataPool_CertSerial"] + ')'

This use case clears all objects (actually just public- and private keys and certificates) from the smartcard, instead of re-initializing the smartcard. This is done by searching all objects on the smartcard and executing a delete operation on each returned object handle. (You just need to login with PIN, to be able to also search for private keys and delete them. No PUK or SO-PIN needed.)

1. Define like this in the encoding description:
   

   [Application_A]
   DeleteAllObjects=true

   Description of the elements:
   

   Element	Description
   DeleteAllObjects=true	Triggers the use case.

You can specify the relation type between card and certificates. Otherwise the default is used (see Object Relation section in Identity Manager Admin):

1. Define like this in the encoding description:
   

   [Application_A]
   ObjectRelationType=MyRelationType

   Description of the elements:
   

   Element	Description
   ObjectRelationType=	Provides the possibility to save the card and certificate to a specified object relation type. If this is not provided in the encoding description, Identity Manager uses default relationship.

Generates a key pair on the smartcard and then invokes a PKCS#10 request (Certificate Signing Request) to a CA (defined by a certificate template name). After receiving the response from the CA with the signed certificate (and optional CA certificates), the user certificate will be written to the beforehand generated key pair. Available CA certificates will also be written to the smartcard to form the chain of trust (can optionally be disabled, see heading "Skip Writing CA Certificates"). Afterwards the CKA_ID and labels of the keys will be modified to match the ones of the written user certificate.

1. Define like this in the encoding description:
   

   [Fields]
   SIGN_PUBKEY=    ## optional
   AuthCertificate.CN=  ## Only needed prior to sprint 166
   AuthCertificate.C=   ## Only needed prior to sprint 166
   ...
    
   [Application_A]
   CertTempl=AuthCertificate
   PubKeyReturnField=SIGN_PUBKEY    ## optional

   Description of the elements:
   

   Element	Description
   CertTempl=...	Defines the certificate template name to be used, which is configured to reference the CA and the token procedure on the CA.
   PubKeyReturnField=...  (optional)	Set this to get the PublicKey back into the mapped fields, that is, into the task.

When requesting a certificate by CSR (P10-Request), it is very useful to also revoke that certificate right after it has been requested (inside jpki_encoder), that is, on client-side before communicating back to the server. This helps in cases where an error occurs and the server could, for example, not fulfil further steps with this certificate. It also benefits from better security when the certificates remains temporary revoked on the CA as long as the user, for example, retracts the temporary revocation on his certificate(s). This triggers a new communication to the CA right after the P10-Request.

On each application which requests a certificate, you could add a flag to indicate temporary revocation:

1. Define like this in the encoding description:
   

   [Application_A]
   CertTempl=MyCertificateTemplateName
   RevokeOnIssue=true
   RevocationReason=certificateHold

   Description of the elements:
   

   Element	Description
   RevokeOnIssue=true	Triggers the temporary revocation directly in InvokeCaApplicationCommand right after the P10-Request.
   RevocationReason=certificateHold	Sets the revocation reason to "certificateHold". This is also the default if no RevocationReason is set.

Nexus Certificate Manager (CM) supports the token procedure type Smart Card. This token procedure type is used to describe various certificates on one type of smart card. When such a card is personalized, CM creates a unique card serial number. 

1. Define like this in the encoding description to let CM create the CM card serial number and return the value:
   

   [Fields]
   CM_CARD_NUMBER=
   ...
   [Application_A]
   CertTempl=AuthCertificate
   CardSerialNumberReturnField=CM_CARD_NUMBER

   Description of the elements:
   

   Element	Description
   CardSerialNumberReturnField=...	Point it to a field.

2. Map the field in CardSerialNumberReturnField to the ${carddatapool_cardnumber} (or to generally any other process variable) and activate the 'read' option. In the example above the cardnumber value would be read from CM_CARD_NUMBER_RETURN_FIELD.

When requesting a certificate for an existing card, for example, in a second, third... application, you use the CardSerialNumberField and point it to a field containing the card serial number. In the following example, Application_A generates the card serial number and reuses the value in the second application to make sure, that the certificate is created on the same card as the previous certificate from Application_A.

1. Define like this in the encoding description:
   

   [Fields]
   CM_CARD_NUMBER=
   ...
   [Application_A]
   CertTempl=AuthCertificate
   CardSerialNumberReturnField=CM_CARD_NUMBER
    
   [Application_B]
   CertTempl=NonRepCertificate
   CardSerialNumberField=CM_CARD_NUMBER

   Description of the elements:
   

   Element	Description
   CardSerialNumberReturnField=...	Point it to a field.
   CardSerialNumberField=...	Point it to a field.

As a smartcard token procedure contains multiple certificates, we eventually need to specify the Key usage of the according certificate. This is done using the KeyUsage key in the description file. It corresponds to the key usage value(s) in the CM definition.

1. Define like this in the encoding description:
   

   [Application_A]
   CertTempl=AuthenticationCertificateSC
   CardSerialNumberReturnField=CM_CARD_NUMBER
   KeyUsage=DigitalSignature,KeyEncipherment
   ...
    
   [Application_B]
   CertTempl=NonRepudiationCertificateSC
   CardSerialNumberField=CM_CARD_NUMBER
   KeyUsage=NonRepudiation
   ...

   
   

The card serial number encoding field (named CM_CARD_NUMBER in the examples above) acts as output and input field for Identity Manager's encoding component.

It is required:

• to map this field in the encoding mappings of the encoding description configuration to a Identity Manager variable or database field using an appropriate JUEL expression and
• to set the Read flag for this field mapping.

Plain-text requests are relevant, when:

• Personal Desktop Client is used and
• the used card profile does not allow to access the private key to sign the request.

Usually, the JPKI-Encoder creates a PKCS10 request that is sent to the server. But in special cases, a plain text request is required. Such profiles are used when customer's processes define, that the certificate/keypair is only activated in the field (by a separate mechanism). Note that the plain text request also requires a CM Token Procedure of type "Smart card". You cannot use the type "PKCS10" and "PKCS12" for this request. To turn on the plain text request, SendPlainTextRequest must be set to true. Regarding the data which is technically sent, see also the actual REST call content behind.

1. Define like this in the encoding description:
   In the following example, all the certificate related fields (subject/distinguished name fields and subject alternative names, keysize, keyusage, the existing publickey and if keyarchival is requested), will be sent as parameters to the server.
   

   [Application_A]
   UseExistingKeyPair=1
   ObjectCriteria=CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,CKA_LABEL,string,"Non Repudiation"
   KeySize=2048
   KeyUsage=NonRepudiation
   SendPlainTextRequest=true
   ...

   Description of the elements:
   

   Element	Description
   SendPlainTextRequest=true	Triggers the use case.

   
   

2. For certain cards that contain pre-generated keys with CKA_ID, it may be required to set this as well, to read the existing ID instead of trying to generate it from the public key's modulus:
   

   ReadExistingPublicKeyId=true

   
   

In the non SKI case, normal PKCS#12 file data is transferred from server to client instead of encrypted key pair.

1. Define like this in the encoding description:
   

   [Fields]
   P12PASSWORD_A=
   P12PASSWORD_B=
   P12CERTIFICATE_A=
   P12CERTIFICATE_B=
   ...

   Encoding Description details:
   

   [Description]
   ...
   Applicationlist=AB
   ClearFields= P12PASSWORD_A,P12Certificate_A,P12PASSWORD_B,P12Certificate_B, ...
    
   [Application_A]
   KeyArchivalRequest=true
   WriteP12Data=true
   Certificate=P12Certificate_A
   P12PASSWORD=P12PASSWORD_A
   CertTempl=PFXEncryptionCert
    
   [Application_B]
   KeyArchivalRequest=true
   WriteP12Data=true
   Certificate=P12Certificate_B
   P12PASSWORD=P12PASSWORD_B
   CertTempl=PFXEncryptionCert

   Description of the elements:
   

   Element	Description
   KeyArchivalRequest=true	Triggers the KeyArchivalRequestPreProcessor which executes the KeyArchival request at the CA.
   WriteP12Data=true	Triggers the WriteP12KeyStoreApplicationCommand which writes P12 certificates to a token/smartcard. This flag is ignored for integrated CA connectors (they get their P12 data via a different mechanism: the client requests the application by ID from the integrated CA connector and receives the P12 data or SKI-encrypted key-pair in the response).
   Certificate=P12Certificate_A	Mapping for the KeyArchival certificate returned by the server side KeyArchival request at the CA. This is ignored for integrated CA connectors (see above).
   P12PASSWORD=P12PASSWORD_A	The P12 password used for the KeyArchival request. It is mandatory to set a P12PASSWORD for the KeyArchivalRequest.
   CertTempl=...	Defines a certificate template name for the KeyArchival request at the CA.
   ClearFields=...	Remember to set ClearFields=... otherwise the P12 container and the P12 password will be written into the database, or might be written to log file (which is often not wished!) when returning the fields after the encoding is done.

   The Result of a P12 request will be stored as base64 encoded value for the requesting application like:

   P12CERTIFICATE_A=MIIDLjCCAhYCAQAwEDEOMAwGA1UEAwwFbmV4dXMwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCvVjkiOMMjeWH/yBlwsuyo6N2mHzFk5ebegtY95meGCjET...
   
   

Encrypted key pair is transferred from server to client. Secure Key Injection (SKI) will only be supported by CardOS 5.4W14 or later middleware with MiniDriver and CardOS card should be 5.3 or higher.

Prerequisites

• The CardOS middleware must be installed on the Identity Manager server
• Set EnableSKI=true in the encoding description to activate SKI.

1. Define like this in the encoding description (in addition to the definition for nonSKI):
   

   [Fields]
   .....
   Thumbprint=
   ...
    
   [Application_A]
   EnableSKI=true
    

   Additional description fields:
   
   

   [Description]
   ...
   CardOSSkiThumbprintField=Thumbprint
   ...
    
   [Application_A]
   ......
   ForceSKI=true

   Description of the elements:
   

   Element	Description
   EnableSKI=true	Enable SKI process execution. SKI is disabled by default.
   CardOSSkiThumbprintField=Thumbprint	Thumbprint will be supplied from Card which was stored earlier (see Card initialization and credentials). Do not forget to set the "Read"-attribute in the "Encoding Fields" tab to get the value into your data-Map.
   ForceSKI=true	If set to true, Identity Manager will perform SKI key archival forcefully, meaning if middleware/card do not support it, the CA connector endpoints will refuse a non-SKI request. This field is optional. SKI card support is checked at client side via smart card driver api. The ForceSKI flag has priority over the EnableSKI flag. The ForceSKI flag enables forcefully execution of SKI use cases even though the EnableSKI flag is not provided. Here are some use cases: ForceSKI EnableSKI Selected process true false SKI true true SKI false true SKI false false Non SKI

To support renaming of the friendly name according to a configurable pattern (also with case-sensitivity) and for renaming friendly names of the CA certificates (intermediates and the root) according to the same pattern, inject this PKCS#12 Repackager mechanism into the KeyArchivalRequestPreProcessor:

<bean id="keyArchivalRequestPreProcessor" class="de.vps.act.action.softtoken.KeyArchivalRequestPreProcessor">
    ...
    <property name="pkcs12Repackager" ref="keyStoreRepackager"/>
</bean>
 
<bean id="keyStoreRepackager" class="de.vps.act.action.softtoken.PKCS12Repackager">
    <property name="friendlyNameNamingStrategy" ref="genericNamingStrategy" />
</bean>
 
<bean id="genericNamingStrategy" class="de.vps.act.action.softtoken.GenericNamingStrategy">
    <property name="juelExpressionResolver" ref="juelExpressionResolver" />
    <!-- use _!CERT_SERIAL_NUM to configure the naming with the certificate serial number in place -->
    <property name="naming" value="§{CN} - _!CERT_SERIAL_NUM" />
    <property name="certSerialInHex" value="true" />
    <property name="prefix"><null/></property>
    <property name="suffix"><null/></property>
</bean>

Note the value of "naming" - here "§{CN} - _!CERT_SERIAL_NUM", where you can mix Juel-like expressions (here with "§" (paragraph) which is resolved out of the certificates' DN), free text and a special identifier _!CERT_SERIAL_NUM (that is replaced by the real certificate serial number of the certificate).

With the property "certSerialInHex" as boolean flag, you can change the usage of the certificate serial number in the friendly name by applying it in hexadecimal (true) or decimal (false) notation. Prefix and suffix are free text options to be attached in front of the resolved naming or behind, however, there is no resolving inside the pre- and suffix, just in the "naming" string sequence.

The Key Recovery use case implements the recovery of already issued certificates. It consists of a (server side) recovery and (client side) writing step and requires following application:

1. Define like this in the encoding description:
   

   [Fields]
   P12CERTIFICATE_A=
   P12PASSWORD_A=
   RecoveryCertificateData_A= ...
    
   [Application_A]
   CertTempl=Recovery
   RecoveryTemplate=Recovery
   KeyRecoveryRequest=true
   Certificate=P12CERTIFICATE_A
   P12PASSWORD=P12PASSWORD_A
   WriteP12Data=true
   RecoveryCertificateData=RecoveryCertificateData_A

   Description of the elements:

   Element	Description
   RecoveryCertificateData	Used to hold the certificate's serial and issuer details which has to be recovered from CA. The recovered certificate data will be retrieved by preprocessor based upon the associated person.

This use case is only supported with CardOS 5.3 or later middleware with MiniDriver and only works when integrated CA connector configured for the respective certificate templates in Identity Manager.

1. Define like this in the encoding description:
   

   [Fields]
   P12CERTIFICATE_A=
   P12PASSWORD_A=
   Thumbprint=
   RecoveryCertificateData_A=
    ...
    
   [Application_A]
   CertTempl=Recovery
   RecoveryTemplate=Recovery
   KeyRecoveryRequest=true
   Certificate=P12CERTIFICATE_A
   P12PASSWORD=P12PASSWORD_A
   WriteP12Data=true
   EnableSKI=true
   CardOSSkiThumbPrintField=Thumbprint
   RecoveryCertificateData=RecoveryCertificateData_A

   Description of the elements:
   

   Element	Description
   RecoveryCertificateData	Used to hold the certificate's serial and issuer details which has to be recovered from CA. The recovered certificate data will be retrieved by preprocessor based upon the associated person.
   CardOSSkiThumbprintField=Thumbprint	Used to read the Card thumbprint value and hold into this field. The card must be initialized and thumbprint value should be available into the card.

   
   

For applications that require a CA-supplied key-pair to be written to the card, key-pair transfer can be enforced via Secure Key Injection (SKI) to prevent eavesdropping by a malicious client. For SKI to work, the CardOS middleware must also be installed on the Identity Manager server. By default, when SKI is not supported, the client may fall back to a less secure non-SKI request.

1. Define like this in the encoding description:
   

   ...
    
   [Application_A]
   ForceSKI=true
   ...

   If the ForceSKI flag is set, then non-SKI PKCS#12 endpoints of the integrated CA connector will refuse to process the application requested by the client and the CA request will be blocked.

Note:

• integrated CA connectors are required for SKI
• the client does not supply the ForceSKI flag to the server for this check (the server already knows it), so it cannot be manipulated by a malicious client attempting a downgrade attack
• this flag of course only makes sense in an SKI-enabled setup with integrated CA connector, the proper cards, middleware (currently only CardOS 5.4+), etc.

To explicitly generate a key pair, trigger it in an application part of the encoding description.

1. Define like this in the encoding description:
   

   [Fields]
   SIGN_PUBKEY=
   ...
    
   [Application_A]
   GenerateKeyPair=true
   PubKeyReturnField=SIGN_PUBKEY
   ...

   Description of the elements:
   

   Element	Description
   GenerateKeyPair=true	Triggers the key pair generation.
   PubKeyReturnField=...	Defines the field in which to store the generated public key. You must also define the field in the Fields section.

When you re-use already generated key pairs on the smartcard, you can search such a key pair to place a certificate to it. This is especially done for signature- and authentication certificates in the context of Nexus Personal Desktop, which creates 2 such key pairs on initialization of the smartcard with a special card profile. A key pair can be searched by an object criteria specifying the following 4 parameters:

• The constant of objects type to be found, for example, CKO_PUBLIC_KEY
• The constant of attribute type to be found, for example, CKA_LABEL
• The type of attribute to be found, for example, string
• The value of the attribute to be found, for example, a label name

1. Define like this in the encoding description:

   [Fields]
   SIGN_PUBKEY=
   ...
    
   [Application_A]
   UseExistingKeyPair=1
   ObjectCriteria=CKO_PUBLIC_KEY,CKA_LABEL,string,'My Sig Key'
   PubKeyReturnField=SIGN_PUBKEY

   Description of the elements:
   

   Element	Description
   UseExistingKeyPair=1	Triggers the key pair discovery.
   PubKeyReturnField=...	Defines the field in which to store the discovered public key. You must also define the field in the Fields section.
   ObjectCriteria=...	See the description above concerning the 4 parameters. Note! Use single quotes (not double quotes) to enclose the value of the attribute.

If you would like to just write user certificates without intermediate certificates and without a root certificate to the smartcard, you can add an encoding property to your certificte application:

1. Define like this in the encoding description:
   

   [Application_A]
   StoreUserCertOnly=true
   ...

   Description of the elements:
   

   Element	Description
   StoreUserCertOnly=true	Triggers writing only user certificates without intermediate certificates and without a root certificate.

   The StoreUserCertOnly option may be used only inside an application that writes a certificate (e.g. defining CertTempl=xyz).

The label (CKA_LABEL value) for certificates, public and private keys using the default template, is generated using the CN from the DN followed by a white space and a two digit counter that starts by 01. The CN is limited to 36 characters. Doing so, the complete value is never longer than 39 characters. The reason for that is that CSPs in Windows have issues with longer values.

For example: Max Mustermann 01

Applying these values, each certificate and key pair bundle carries a unique name. However, the generation of the label can be configured using the keys Description/labelCounter and Application_X/LabelTemplate.

LabelCounter is the start value for the global counter.

LabelTemplate is the template that instructs the generation of the label. It has following syntax: LabelTemplate=[<labelAttr>=<value>],[<labelAttr>=<value>],…

Valid values for labelAtrr:

Corresponding to this definition, the default label template is

labeltemplate=limitedname=36,blank=1,certcounter

The content of the every type of LabelTemplate can also be concatenated using the fields in the Fields section of the encoding description, using an expression language based on the exclamation mark. See https://docs.spring.io/spring-framework/reference/core/expressions.html for details. Examples:

// Just provide the whole via a field:
LabelTemplate=!{FIELD_NAME} 
// Or concatenate different parts:
LabelTemplate=fixtext=!{FIELD_NAME}
// The language has a sophisticated syntax and tuff like this also work:
LabelTemplate=fix!{'text=Bla,snr'} // -> fixtext=Bla,snr -> Bla123B4
// Or really complex stuff:
LabelTemplate=fixtext=!{MODEL.contains('4') ? 'EF.C.ICC.EX' + CERT_INDEX + '.RSA : 'Ex. Certificate ' + CERT_INDEX}

1. Define like this in the encoding description:
   

   [Application_X]
   LabelTemplate=<A template as described above. This is for the actual user certificate>
   LabelTemplateCertRoot=<The template string for root certificates. This applies for all  certificates being written by the corresponding application>
   LabelTemplateCertIntermediate=<The template string for intermediate certificates. This applies for all certificates being written by the corresponding application>
   PrivateKeyLabelTemplate=<The template string for private keys. This applies for all private being written by the corresponding application if supported. See below.> 
   PublicKeyLabelTemplate=<The template string for public keys. This applies for all public being written by the corresponding application if supported. See below.>

   PrivateKeyLabelTemplate is not supported for the Idopte middleware with secure channel support. 

   PublicKeyLabelTemplate is not supported for middlewares, that don't manage an explicit public key object. This includes CryptoVision, Personal Desktop Classic, Atos CardAPI, Idopte middle.

When an object (certificate, public or private key) on the card is stored or created, it contains a set of attributes as defined by the PKCS#11 standard. The PKCS#11 standard typically names this set as template. For our use cases, templates are used for:

• storing a certificate (using a certificate template),
• storing a private key (using a private key template),
• creating a key pair (using a private key and public key template).

The set of attributes are basically "hard coded" by the JPKIEncoder. However, the attribute sets can be varied by the corresponding description file entry. Using such an entry,

• may change the value of the corresponding attribute,
• may extend the default list of attributes inclusive defining their values.

The CKA_ID establishes the link between certificate, private and public key.

Variant 1: It is stored as twenty bytes long value, generated from the public key’s modulus using the SHA-1 hash algorithm.

Variant 2: Alternatively, the SubjectKeyIdentifier of the object bundle is used, when this field is contained in the corresponding certificate of the object bunch. The SubjectKeyIdentifier is then stored in its DER encoded form.

Example for variant 2:

A certificates' SubjectKeyIdentifier is defined in the x509 extensions section, as seen in this image:

• This SubjectKeyIdentifier is then taken for CKA_ID generation with the following generation rules:
  1. Byte is an encoding identifier. Generally DER encoding is preferred, represented by the byte sequence 04h.
  2. Byte is the length of the SubjectKeyIdentifier (here 6 bytes, therefore 06h).
  3. The following Bytes are the SubjectKeyIdentifier bytes.
• The resulting CKA_ID (8 bytes length) then is: 0406014B2ADD5F66 (=example)

1. To change the default sets used by the JPKIEncoder, define like this in the encoding description:
   

   [Application_A]
   WiteCertificate=TRUE
   AttributesCert=CKA_PRIVATE=FALSE,CKA_MODIFIABLE=TRUE,...
    
   [Application_B]
   CreateKeyPair=TRUE
   AttributesPubKey=CKA_MODIFIABLE=TRUE,CKA_DERIVE=FALSE,...
   AttributesPrvKey=CKA_MODIFIABLE=TRUE,CKA_DERIVE=FALSE,...
    
   [Application_C]
   WriteP12Data=true
   AttributesCert=CKA_PRIVATE=FALSE,CKA_MODIFIABLE=TRUE,...
   AttributesPubKey=CKA_MODIFIABLE=TRUE,CKA_DERIVE=FALSE,...
   AttributesPrvKey=CKA_MODIFIABLE=TRUE,CKA_DERIVE=FALSE,...

   Description of the elements:
   

   Element	Description
   AttributesCert=...	Contains comma separated lists of [Attribute]=[Value] pairs which are used when the object is written or created. When specified using one of these three attributes, it may either overwrite the above named default value or add this value to the template.
   AttributesPubKey=...	~
   AttributesPrvKey=...	~

These attributes are supported to be overwritten or added to the JPKIEncoder’s default templates:

Similar to the definition of extra attributes, the encoding description allows the definition of optional attributes (which is, however, a JPKIEncoder internal name for the way to consider these attributes). The general meaning of this feature is also minor, see the remarks below.

The mechanism to apply optional attributes, works like this:

• A Smartcard object (certificate, public key, private key) is created on the card. It then owns some attributes as described above in the section for standard and default attributes.
• When optional attributes are defined in the description file, the JPKIEncoder checks if such an attribute exists and if it has a different value from the requested one. If so, it updates the existing value.

The mechanism basically exists to support various middleware with various support of such attributes - without having knowledge how far a middleware uses such attributes.

1. Define the optional attributes like this in the encoding description:
   

   [Description]
   AttributesCertRootOpt=CKA_START_DATE,CKA_END_DATE...
   AttributesCertIntermediateOpt=CKA_START_DATE,CKA_END_DATE...
    
   [Application_A]
   WiteCertificate=TRUE
   AttributesCertOpt=CKA_START_DATE,CKA_END_DATE,...
    
   [Application_B]
   CreateKeyPair=TRUE
   AttributesCertOpt=CKA_START_DATE,CKA_END_DATE,...
   AttributesPubKeyOpt=CKA_TRUSTED=FALSE,...
   AttributesPrvKeyOpt=CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED=FALSE,...
    
   [Application_C]
   WriteP12Data=TRUE
   AttributesCertOpt=CKA_START_DATE,CKA_END_DATE,...
   AttributesPubKeyOpt=CKA_TRUSTED=FALSE,...
   AttributesPrvKeyOpt=CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED=FALSE,...

   Description of the elements
   

   The examples above demonstrate the usage of optional attributes for allowed use cases. Please note the specialty of the separate and global attribute definition for root and intermediate certificates. Attributes for user certificates are always taken from the corresponding Application_X section, but if an Application_X defined use case provides root or intermediate certificates, their definition is taken from the global Description section. The table describes all allowed attributes that may be used as optional attributes. The actual usage of an attribute depends on the corresponding object and use case.

   Attributes of type CK_BBOOL and CK_ULONG require a corresponding value in the encoding description. CK_DATE and Byte array values are implicitly generated from the related certificate and do not require a value. That means, the different kind of attributes are defined like this:

   AttributesCertOpt=CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE=TRUE,CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY=1,CKA_START_DATE,CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY

   
   

   Attribute	Data type	Value (as appearing in the dsc file)
   CKA_DERIVE	CK_BBOOL	TRUE | FALSE
   CKA_LOCAL	CK_BBOOL	TRUE | FALSE
   CKA_MODIFIABLE	CK_BBOOL	TRUE | FALSE
   CKA_ENCRYPT	CK_BBOOL	TRUE | FALSE
   CKA_VERIFY	CK_BBOOL	TRUE | FALSE
   CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER	CK_BBOOL	TRUE | FALSE
   CKA_WRAP	CK_BBOOL	TRUE | FALSE
   CKA_TRUSTED	CK_BBOOL	TRUE | FALSE
   CKA_SENSITIVE	CK_BBOOL	TRUE | FALSE
   CKA_DECRYPT	CK_BBOOL	TRUE | FALSE
   CKA_SIGN	CK_BBOOL	TRUE | FALSE
   CKA_SIGN_RECOVER	CK_BBOOL	TRUE | FALSE
   CKA_UNWRAP	CK_BBOOL	TRUE | FALSE
   CKA_EXTRACTABLE	CK_BBOOL	TRUE | FALSE
   CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE	CK_BBOOL	TRUE | FALSE
   CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE	CK_BBOOL	TRUE | FALSE
   CKA_PRIVATE	CK_BBOOL	TRUE | FALSE
   CKA_TRUSTED	CK_BBOOL	TRUE | FALSE
   CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED	CK_BBOOL	TRUE | FALSE
   CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE	CK_BBOOL	TRUE | FALSE
   CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY	CK_ULONG	Categorization of the certificate: 0 = unspecified (default value), 1 = token user, 2 = authority, 3 = other entity
   CKA_START_DATE	CK_DATE	Implicit. Start date for the certificate, taken from the certificate that was encoded.
   CKA_END_DATE	CK_DATE	Implicit. End date for the certificate, taken from the certificate that was encoded.
   CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY	Byte array	Implicit. SHA-1 hash of the subject public key, automatically calculated from the certificate that was encoded.
   CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY	Byte array	Implicit. SHA-1 hash of the issuer public key, automatically calculated from the certificate that was encoded.
   CKA_CHECK_VALUE	Byte array	Implicit. First  three  bytes  of  the  SHA-1  hash  of  the  certificate’s attribute CKA_VALUE, automatically calculated from the certificate that was encoded

Transport certificates (TC) are a Nexus Personal Desktop feature for cards that are pre-personalized with keypairs. The purpose of a transport certificate is to guarantee the originator of the pre-personalized card, to avoid that other cards, with non-secret private keys, are used when issuing certificates. The public keys on a pre-personalized smart card produced in the Key Generation System (KGS) are normally not signed and therefore not protected against tampering during the transport from the KGS to the Registration Authority (RA) where the cards are personalized. To improve the security of the issuing system, the public key can be embedded in a transport certificate signed by a dedicated "transport CA". When the personalization takes place in the RA, a special token procedure must be selected by the officer. The token procedure must include a special modifier that checks the signature and validity of the transport certificate.

Generally, a certificate requested using a TC will replace the TC on the card. When - in the future - the requested certificate is renewed, the requested certificate will in turn act as a TC.

Identity Manager supports transport certificates. Nexus CM must be used as a CA. If pre-personalized cards with generated keypairs are being used, any transport certificates matching the generated keys will automatically be used. The requested certificate will automatically replace the TC. No further configuration is needed in Identity Manager. The JPKIEncoder Log will indicate whether a transport certificate was found or not.

This is an example of an encoding description:

# This encoding can also be used for transport certificates (TC). For this, the card must be prepersonalized with a TC
# and the certificate templates referenced with CertTempl must be configured on the CM to use TC
[Encoding]
Type = 1024,Chip
Devices = 8710
[Fields]
PublicKeyPlain=
PublicKeyP10=
PIN=
[Description]
PKCS11Library = personal.dll
Applicationlist = A
PIN=PIN
 
# Plain request
[Application_A]
CertTempl = EncHardCodedValues
# Currently (190410) UseExistingKeyPair isn't needed
#UseExistingKeyPair=1
ObjectCriteria=CKO_PRIVATE_KEY,CKA_LABEL,string,"Non Repudiation"
KeyUsage=NonRepudiation
SendPlainTextRequest=true
ReadExistingPublicKeyId=true
# Will hold the discovered public key
PubKeyReturnField = PublicKeyPlain
labeltemplate=fixtext=Non Repudiation
 
# PKCS#10 request
[Application_B]
CertTempl = EncHardCodedValuesP10
# Currently (190410) UseExistingKeyPair isn't needed
#UseExistingKeyPair=1
ObjectCriteria=CKO_PRIVATE_KEY,CKA_LABEL,string,"Digital Signature"
KeyUsage=DigitalSignature
ReadExistingPublicKeyId=true
# Will hold the discovered public key
PubKeyReturnField = PublicKeyP10
labeltemplate=fixtext=Digital Signature

1.  Install current version of CM Key Generation System
2. Install Personal Desktop Client, see Install Personal Desktop Client.

3. In C:\Program Files (x86)\Nexus\Certificate Manager\Key Generation System\Cardprofiles you can find some CPFs. The ones that end with "Transport" are relevant. Choose one fitting the card you want to use, for example, RaP15Siemens50_2FCa1P_2048_OKG_KAR_Transport.cpf for a CardOS 5.0 ("50" stands for the CardOS version) token, and copy it to some directory. Uncomment the following lines in your copy:

   .cpf

   MakeCardEraseable()
   SEC_OP = '3333333333333333'
   SEC_PUK1 = '123456789012'
   SEC_PIN1 = '11111111'

   and comment out the previous values for SEC_*. Note that the profile for 5.0 cards specifies PIN minlength = 8. Initializing with "132435" will seem to work but you won't be able to log in or change PIN. To be sure, search for "minlength" in the cpf you use.

4. Some certificates are needed. Example certificates can be found in C:\Program Files (x86)\Nexus\Certificate Manager\Key Generation System\Certificates. Open the Personal GUI > View > Preferences > Electronic Identity Token Search > Browse > open the aforementioned folder > Add.
   You should now see tcsigner in your Nexus Personal GUI, its PIN is 1234 . This will be the the CA for signing the transport certificates.

5. Edit C:\Program Files (x86)\Nexus\Certificate Manager\Key Generation System\ppa.cfg or %APPDATA%\Nexus\Certificate Manager\Key Generation System\ppa.cf (the latter wins, if it exists), and make the following adjustments:

   ppa.cfg

   [Script]
   File=c:\path\to\your\copy\of\yourEditedTransport.cpf
    
   [PIN Encryption]
   File=C:\Program Files (x86)\Nexus\Certificate Manager\Key Generation System\Certificates\pin.crt
    
   [Transport CA]
   dll-transportca=TransportCa.dll
   dll-pkcs11=C:\Program Files (x86)\Personal\bin\personal.dll
   name=tcsigner
   ; setting cacert=... is optional, but if you do specify it, it has to match the signer specified above
   cacert="C:\Program Files (x86)\Nexus\Certificate Manager\Key Generation System\Certificates\tcsigner.cer"
   pin=1234
   validity=365
    
   [Trace]
   directory=C:\tmp\Personal_Log

6. Start KGS.
7. Select Target card reader.
8. Insert an erased card with the OS that fits your CPF.
9. Click Start.
10. In case of errors, consult the logfile specified in the [Trace] section.

1. Copy config\certformats\rfc5280.conf to config\certformats\rfc5280-tc.conf

2. Edit rfc5280-tc.conf and add transport certificate module after ID2Legacy:

   TransportCertificate = 6

3. Edit config\tcconfig.conf as you see fit.
4. Restart CM.
5. Clone an existing certificate procedure using rfc5280 certificate format and edit it
   • Rename appropriately
   • Set Certificate Format to rfc5280-tc (the one you just created)
6. Clone a token procedure that uses the certificate procedure you just cloned and edit it
   • Rename appropriatelly
   • Set Certificate Procedure to the one you just created
   • Set Storage Profile to PKCS10

7. Further information can be found here:

   • Configure the Certificate Factory in Certificate Manager, heading "Configure transport certificates"
   • Configure Key Generation System in Certificate Manager
   • Troubleshooting Certificate Manager clients, heading "Error situations related to transport certificates"
   • Key Generation System, Operator's Guide, sections:
     • 2.1. A Stand-alone System
     • 2.3. Transport Certificates
     • 2.4.1.7. Transport CA
   • CM Technical Description:
     • 2.2.5.4. Transport Certificate
     • 3.4.2. Using Transport Certificates
     • 3.7.3. Key Generation System

The type of the created keys is coded into the KeySize property. The value is 'ECC/' plus a curve name. Supported curves are limited by Bouncy Castle, the PKCS#11 middleware and the certificate authority. For details, refer to the respective documentation. The PKCS10SigningAlgorithm needs to be specified when using elliptic curves cryptography.

PRIME 3.9: Elliptic curves is only supported for Cryptovision and Nexus Certificate Manager. Other middlewares are guaranteed to NOT work, while other CA connectors are not tested.

PRIME 3.10: Support is added for TCOS cards with ECC. Note that those only support SHA1_ECDSA as PKCS10SigningAlgorithm, SHA2-variants do not work.

PRIME 3.11: Support is added for EJBCA.

1. Define like this in the encoding description:
   

   [Application_A]
   CertTempl=SigCert
   KeySize=ECC/prime256v1
   PKCS10SigningAlgorithm=SHA256_ECDSA
    
   [Application_B]
   CertTempl=AuthCert
   KeySize=ECC/brainpoolP256r1
   PKCS10SigningAlgorithm=SHA256_ECDSA